Exploring how the application of these ideological principles has impacted on the structure and function of the Ethiopian federal system, the research examines the ways in which these ideological policies of the ruling party affect national consensus, protection of human rights, the rights of minority groups, separation of power principles and the relationship between the federal and regional governments.
It also explores the extent to which ideological principles have had an impact on the democratization process, rule of law and in building up institutions such as parliamentary democracy, the judiciary, the media and civil society organizations in the country. Approaching the Ethiopian federal system from the perspective of the fundamental ideological principles of the party in power allows a deeper insight into the structure and function of the ethnic federal system.
The Last Post-Cold War Socialist Federation. Ethnicity, Ideology and Democracy in Ethiopia, 1st Edition. By Semahagn Gashu Abebe. Routledge. pages. Editorial Reviews. Review. 'A splendid analysis of the ideological principles of the The Last Post-Cold War Socialist Federation: Ethnicity, Ideology and Democracy Ethiopia's ethnic federal system however is essentially a socialist federal.
Becoming a member of the LoveReading community is free. The Devil's Horn Anna Nicholas. Fade To Grey John Lincoln.
The Last Hillwalker John D. Quitters Never Win Michael Bisping. In fact, the large majority of people professed and practised other faiths such as Islam, Judaism, Waaqeefanna and numerous other traditional African religions.
The state was monolingual, but the country was multilingual. The State was projected as mono-cultural as having the culture of the Amhara-Tigryan civilizational continuum but the country was obviously a country of diverse culture. The State projected homogeneity, but the lives of the peoples suggested heterogeneity.
The vast majority of the people lived in the rural villages. But the local peoples of these towns and their surroundings hardly had access to these facilities. In other words, these services were self-serving. The state was thus projected as having sovereignty and exclusive jurisdiction over all sorts of disputes in the territory -with all the grandeur of legal centralism — but the diverse peoples of the country had their own distinct laws and dispute resolution mechanisms over which their own wise men often the elders asserted their jurisdiction the right to speak the law, literally.
Queens, From this perspective, it can be safely argued that the suspension of the right to a self-government, as a final analysis, suspends the right of self-determination including secession. Becoming a member of the LoveReading community is free. Woredas , at least formally. It was negotiated in the times between and , a time which, seen in the longue duree of the history of the Ethiopian state, witnessed a crisis. This narrative can be summarized as follows:. Hence, their pedestal political position is put to a halt or at least compromised.
The Bale Oromo resistance of the mid and late s was more an expression of resentment to imperial hegemony but it was also limited in its national aspiration to delegitimize Ethiopia and break away from it. Nevertheless, these movements indicated the tensions at the heart of the state form and revealed the foretaste of the direction politics will take in the subsequent years . A similar disenchantment of the university and college students of the s was already expressing itself in the form of writings, demonstrations, and protests by this time.
At the same time, questions directly pointing to the unfinished nature of the nation-building project, its illegitimate beginnings, violent inauguration, and its oppressive manifestations unscrupulous domination, continuous marginalization, unabated exploitation, coercive assimilation and cultural denigration, and its unbearable systematic social violence started to rear their head among the more informed and the more radical student leaders.
It exposed the deficit in equality, inclusion, and representation. For Wallelign, Ethiopian state nationalism was merely a mask for Amhara-Tigriyan ethnocracy that passes for a universal pan-Ethiopian patriotism . Wallelign had also suggested the principle of self-determination as a corrective to this deficit and the injustice thereof. The moral gesture in favor of self-determination was of course more instrumental than essential, as national self-determination was to be pursued to dismantle the infrastructure of imperial hierarchy thereby paving the way for a socialist redistributive State.
Moreover, by interrogating the mainstream state nationalist narrative, his critique, perhaps unwittingly, de-centered the Amhara-Tigryan cultural code that formed the core of Ethiopian nationalism and exposed the moral vacuity of this nationalism in and of itself.
It exposed the hollowness of the constitutive components that make the Ethiopian State home to all who reside in it. The question of what constitutes Ethiopia—and who the Ethiopian is—remains to be an open-ended question until now. Red Sea Press, The historical cut-off point is often the reign of Tewodros II which started in Whenever it is strong, it has projected itself as a Christian Kingdom in the Southern periphery of the larger Christian civilization.
All the Imperial correspondences of the times make this crystal clear. He then gives a quick answer by identifying one of the reasons why it qualifies to be called an Empire. Indeed, the school system and the military served as two important institutions for the promotion of pan-Ethiopian identity.
Accordingly, even in this election as in the past elections political groupings with the Northern and urban constituency AEUP, UDJ, Semayawi, New Generation Party [Addis Tiwilid Party ATP ], Ethiopian Democratic Party EDP tend to use language of unity as opposed to equality , territorial integrity as opposed to self-determination , individual rights as opposed to collective and group-differentiated rights , civil and political rights such as freedom of press, expression, assembly, and association as opposed to socio-economic and cultural rights such as the right to land, culture, language, identity, social equality, and recognition of collective subjectivity , individual autonomy and the liberties thereof as opposed to justice for past violation of collective dignity, gross discrimination on the basis of language, identity, and culture and dislocation and dispossession , civic or pan-Ethiopian identity as opposed to ethno-national particular-Ethiopian identities.
The South emphasizes the imperial-colonial legacy of the state and the atrocities visited upon their populations and the plunder done to their property by the northern elite in the name of nation-building. They seek acknowledgement of historical injustices for what they were and undoing of the infrastructure of oppression ingrained in the Ethiopian State form.
It is no accident that Medrek insists that its program for Ethiopia is implementation of social democracy. This same pattern is replicated among the political forces that are operating from outside—armed or unarmed. The Northern parties seek to preserve the state form but seek to reform it through infusing democracy. The Southern parties seek to transform the state by radically changing it through the instrumentality of the right to self-determination. The North assumes that our redemption is in simple electoral democracy. The South affirms that our redemption is in recognition of our plurality, the state-perpetrated injustices of the past and the present, and the entrenchment of equality and equalization schemes.
For the latter, self-determination is not only a tool for decolonizing the state but also to guarantee a relationship of full equality in the context of democratic governance. Cambridge University Press, Thus, the content of the pan-Ethiopian identity that is propagated as part of State nationalism was questioned. In other words, the outer limit of the content of Ethiopian identity was explored.